To make voters informed, VAA needs to collect the information from candidates, present the information to voters, and then the informed voters are expected to change their political behavior. To estimate the connection and effectiveness of VAA, data from the iVoter program in Taiwan's 2012 legislative election, which is introduced in the fourth chapter of this book, is exploited. Empirical analysis shows that candidates who are young and familiar with the Internet tend to cooperate with the iVoter. Contrary to the prediction, incumbents cooperated more than challengers, and there is no difference between candidates from major and minor parties on the level of cooperation. Analysis on the registered participants reveals that they were mostly young, male, and welleducated. Overall 80 percent of the participants considered iVoter as helpful, and this supportive attitude correlates with more online political participations among the leastengaged participants. Even iVoter did not boost the turnout, considerable proportation of iVoter participants turned to support minor parties on election day. Implication and suggestion to future VAA development is finally discussed.
Introduction
As is discussed in the first chapter of this book, the ultimate goal of voting advice application (VAA hereafter) is to make citizens better informed and therefore to deepen the democracy. To reach this goal, the building of VAA is composed of three consecutive steps.
On the supply side, workers of the VAA collect information which is helpful for vote choice.
On the demand side, voters use the VAA. And on the outcome side, voters will be better informed and then make vote choice accordingly. Ideally, VAA can glean and summarize all of the information in elections, and send the information to every voter; informed voter can then make better decision, and in the end the election result will reflect the will of the people.
However, the reality is far from the ideal. During information gathering, parties and candidates may not cooperate with the VAA; they do not have a say on some of the important political issues, or they refuse to announce their policy stance (Page, 1976) . As a result, voters can hardly juxtapose all candidates on ballot by using the VAA with only incomplete profiles. While information is provided,VAA may not be accessible to every voter. The analysis of the background of VAA users can help future VAA promotion to unreached target groups. After the information is transmitted, receivers may not update their mind fairly; the upcoming information may conflict with VAA user's existing belief (Lodge and Taber, 2005; Lau and Redlawsk, 2006) , or the new information may cause cognitive overload (Boatwright and Nunes, 2001 ).
The aim of this chapter is to explore the reality of the three steps of VAA, basing on the data from iVoter program in Taiwan Exploratory analysis of the data from iVoter can address the following questions. First, why are some candidates willing to make clear their policy stance, while others choose to hide? Second, who are the VAA users? Third, is the information provided by iVoter helpful to the users? Did they change their political behavior because of using the iVoter? The analysis in this chapter can not only reexamine the mechanism and effectiveness of iVoter, but also provide suggestions for further establishment of the VAA in the future.
Why Do Candidates Cooperate with VAA?
Information about candidates' policy orientations is the crucial part for the iVoter to build matching mechanism. The policy orientation of the candidates can be measured by different methods, all of which has its own limitation. Many researchers apply text-mining on congressional records, roll-call voting, or news articles to systematically calculate candidates' policy stance or ideological score (Garzia and Marschall, 2012; Poole and Rosenthal, 2001; Yu, Kaufmann and Diermeier, 2008) . However, these sources strongly prefer incumbents and well-known candidates, which undermines the original goal of VAA -voters may already know the policy orientations of these candidates. Moreover, not every candidate would publicly speak out his or her preference on all political issues, which makes them noncomparable in the VAA matching mechanism. As a result, the "Doe de Stemtest!" in Belgian only lists a selection of parties, which is described as the "narrow approach" by Garzia and Marschall (2012) .
The solution to the problem of non-comparability is intuitive -we can ask all of the candidates about their policy orientations on all of the important political issues. If every candidate and party responded, VAA can calculate the policy or ideological distance between the user and all candidates, and then give precise suggestion on vote choice. The establishment of EU Profiler is one of the most famous cases conducting surveys to all of the parties (Trechsel and Mair, 2011) .It is also what iVoter did during the 2012 Taiwan's legislative election.
Soon an unavoidable problem emerged: some candidates refused to cooperate with iVoter.
2 They abandoned the chance to be exposed on iVoter website and to be matched by the potential supporters. On the one hand, by cooperating with VAA candidates can attract voters with similar policy orientation, enjoy one more media exposure, and get familiar with this new technology. After all, campaigning through the Internet has become an irreversible trend (Williams and Girish, 2013) .
On the other hand, however, numerous disadvantages may undermine candidate's willingness of cooperation. First, candidates may avoid taking position on controversial issues which may distract supporters. Hillygus and Shields (2014) point out that partisan supporters can be persuaded to vote for the opposite when one of their policy attitudes conflicts with the party elite. Second, clear policy standing may also cause intra-party conflict with other party member (Garzia and Marschall, 2012) and therefore make party brand tarnished (Aldrich, 2011, Chp. 2) . Third, candidate's responses on policy position questions can be seen as a commitment before the election, which implies that the candidate will be overseen and may lose the space of negotiation among interest groups in the future.
The positive and negative factors of cooperating with VAA have different effect on candidates with different background; candidate's strategy on cooperation would be systematically influenced by individual characteristics. First, the size of candidate's party matters. Small parties need more media exposure to make known to the voters. Since the traditional news media is usually dominated by major parties, VAA would be a better chance for minor par-ties to connect with the potential supporters. Moreover, members of the small party may suffer less intra-party conflict since the number of member is smaller and therefore would be easier to negotiate.
Candidates from small parties tend to cooperate with VAA (+).
Second, challengers would much likely to cooperate with VAA. Jacobson (1978) shows that challenger's campaigning is especially important because it helps challenger be known by the voters; VAA can broadcast challenger's policy orientation to the voters. Moreover, incumbents had won election at least once, and they owned official resource in the next election (Jacobson, 1989) . The incumbent advantage implies that incumbent already attracted the number of supporters larger enough to win election without the help of VAA. In contrast,
VAA will post their policy orientation to the public, which may drive away his or her original supporters. Hence, H 2 : Incumbents are less likely to cooperate (-).
Third, less competitive candidates would much likely to cooperate with VAA. Following the vote-maximization assumptions, candidate who is in relatively disadvantaged starting point in election would find any way to promote him or herself. Even though the effect of cooperating with VAA is uncertain, less competitive candidates would be more riskacceptance since they have nothing to lose. In contrast, leading candidates would just like to keep the status quo until the election day. The electoral system of Taiwan's 2012 legislative election is Single-Member District, so competitiveness of candidate may not be the same as the size of party or incumbency. It is possible that some emerging politicians are much famous than existing ones. Another possibility is that the major party leader may choose not to nominate incumbent in his party owing to scandal or violation to party discipline.
H 3 : Less competitive candidates tend to cooperate (+).
Fourth, age may be another influential factor of using VAA. Young candidates may be more familiar with the Internet, so they are willing to cooperate with new technology like VAA. Besides, many young candidates are less known or are lack of grassroots mobility, increasing the necessity of promoting them through VAA.
H 4 : Young candidates tend to cooperate (+).
In the end, candidates who are familiar with the Internet may choose to cooperate with VAA. Since VAA is established in recent year, the effect of VAA remains unknown to candidates. As is discussed above, uncertainty causes doubt and then rejection. However, if the candidate already knows the Internet well, which can be observed by building website, interacting with the Internet users online, or use social network profile like facebook, he or she may be able to understand the benefit of VAA. Therefore, their willingness of cooperation would be higher. Previous studies in the Europe show that young people and those who are prone to use new technology tend to use the VAA (Alvarez et al., 2014; Cedroni, 2010; Marschall and Schultze, 2012) ; similar socio-demographic factor would also apply to the candidates.
Candidates familiar with the Internet tend to cooperate (+). Apart from partisanship, incumbency may be another reason for declining cooperation. One possible explanation for the unexpected findings is that the 2012 legislative election is the debut of iVoter program. Since the influence of iVoter on voteshare was uncertain, candidate's choice of cooperation is based on their familiarity to the new technology; young candidates and FB-owned candidates responded to iVoter more. This result is similar to previous studies on VAA users (Alvarez et al., 2014; Cedroni, 2010; Marschall and Schultze, 2012) . With time goes by and the online campaign becomes the routine, we can be optimistic that in the future more candidates will cooperate with VAAs.
Data and Analysis
Size of parties fail to explain the cooperation of VAA. There is no difference on the level of cooperation between major and minor parties. Moreover, the choice of cooperation is When it comes to the incumbency, it may be because the 21-item questionnaire came from the congressional records, so incumbents would have more knowledge on the issues.
Another possibility is the resource hypothesis. Williams and Girish (2013) Even though the incumbents owned the potential advantage on responding to VAA, this phenomenon does not mean that the problem of "narrow approach" cannot be mitigated.
Since the iVoter workers distributed the questionnaire to all of the candidates, candidates were granted the chance to expose themselves. What VAA workers can do is to persuade the candidates to treasure the channel. Therefore, if more evidence can be provided to show the effect of VAA on challenger's voteshare, theirs willingness of cooperation may increase.
Moreover, the questionnaire may further push single-issue party to formulate the manifesto with concerns on more issues (Garzia and Marschall, 2012) .
Is VAA helpful to Voters?
The first half of this chapter focused on the supply side of information in election, and the second half emphasizes on the demand side. Since the goal of VAA is to give advice on vote choice, VAA should be accessible to those who (are assumed to) need advise. Once the advice was provided, user of VAA should be informed and hence change political behavior.
The following section is composed of three parts: descriptive analysis of iVoter users, their self-reported evaluation on iVoter, and their behavioral change during the election.
Who used the iVoter?
During the 2012 legislative election, there were over 40000 people with different IP address visited the iVoter website. iPad lottery was provided for recruitment, and after the election 647 participants completed both the pre-and post-election questionnaire. In other words, the registered participants are opted-in samples, which limits us on the boundary of inference. Table 3 shows the social-demographic background of the registered participants. In this table, it is clear that most of the iVoter users were young, male, and highly educated. This result is similar to previous studies on VAA users in German, Swiss, and the Europe (Alvarez et al., 2014; Cedroni, 2010; Marschall and Schultze, 2012) . Moreover, according to the 2014 daily report from Taiwan Network Information Center 7 , 77.7 percent of Taiwanese citizen use the Internet, and most of them are also young, male, and highly educated. Therefore, iVoter users were those who already surf on the Internet often. Besides, Lin and Wang (2007) point out that old, male, and educated Taiwanese citizen has higher political knowledge. In comparison, young generation has lower score on the political knowledge items. Therefore, one potential benefit of iVoter is to provide political information to the young generation and increase their political knowledge. Nevertheless, this hypothesis needs further examination.
Subjective Evaluation of iVoter
In the post-election questionnaire, the last two items asked participants their feeling toward iVoter. Table 4 is the proportion of participants who agreed that iVoter is helpful.
Overall participants responded positively, while more people consider that iVoter is especially helpful on providing policy position of the parties. The reason for the difference may be because low level of response rate among the candidates. iVoter user's level of satisfaction is similar to the case of EUProfiler, which is also close to 80 percent (Alvarez et al., 2014) . Figure 2 shows the result of two Logit regressions explaining participant's evaluation of iVoter. In both of the models, users who were less-educated tend to consider iVoter as helpful, after the model controls for participant's partisanship, gender, age, and daily Internet usage.
If the level of education can be equated with political knowledge, the evidence provided here suggest that iVoter indeed helps those who need to be informed. Besides, in both model the estimated coefficient on age is negative, and in the right figure the coefficient is significant (p = 0.003). When a participant is younger one year, his or her possibility of supporting iVoer would increase 0.6 and 3 percent, respectively. This result indicates that iVoter program benefits the young generation on learning more about the parties in Taiwan. 
Effectiveness of iVoter
Once a voter is informed by VAA, he or she is expected to change the political participation and vote choice. Previous studies focus on the effect of VAA on turnout (Ladner and Pianzola, 2010; Marschall and Schultze, 2012) , motivation to collect more information (Marschall and Schultze, 2012) , and vote choice (Garzia and Marschall, 2012) . This section compares the result of iVoter to previous works.
In the both waves of the questionnaire, the registered iVoter participants were asked about their vote choice, turnout, and online political participation during the electionThe first wave was applied before they used the iVoter matching program, while the second one was conducted after the election. The effect of iVoter can be estimated by the correlation between participant's evaluation of iVoter (treatment) and the change of political behavior (outcome). One advantage of this approach is that participant's behavior before and after using the iVoter was recorded by self-report. Hence, the change of behavior after using the iVoter would be a better estimator than the motivation of collecting more information on measuring the effect of VAA. Figure 3 shows the estimation of the effect of iVoter on online political participation.
The dependent variable in the left plot is the number of form of online political participation in the post-election questionnaire, including signing petition, watching video ad, donating, reading the introduction of candidates, and so on; the dependent variable in the right plot is the number of party website visited in the post-election questionnaire. In both plots, the first line is the interaction effect between participant's online political behavior before using iVoter and participant's subjective evaluation on iVoter, estimated by Poisson regression. In Figure 3 , the two independent variable positively correlates with the dependent variable, while the interaction term is significantly negative -this result indicates that iVoter can increase the online political participation among the least-engaged voters. If one voter had never visited any party website, the experience of using iVoter would in average promoted him or her to visit one more website and do something on it. With the aid of panel data, this study provides the evidence that VAA can indeed enhance online political participation (not only the motivation), especially among those who were least-engaged.
Similar approach is used on measuring the effect of iVoter on turnout, which is shown in Figure 4 . However, both the subjective evaluation of iVoter and the interaction term are not significantly different from zero, indicating that VAA has trivial effect on turnout.
In comparison, the only significant explanatory factor is one's willingness to vote before using the iVoter and before the election. This result conflicts with previous studies in the Europe (Ladner and Pianzola, 2010; Marschall and Schultze, 2012) .One possible reason for the non-finding is because the turnout rate in Taiwan is already high (74.7 percent in 2012 legislative election). Hence, the additional information provided by VAA may not overcome other factors that preventing people from getting out and vote. Overall, the iVoter participants have higher turnout rate (78.7 percent) than the whole population, but the causal relationship cannot be drawn here due to data limitation.
Figure 4: Effectiveness of iVoter on Turnout
In the end, Table 5 is the cross-table on participants' vote choice before using iVoter and after the election. In this table, the most interesting phenomenon is that the iVoter pushed people to support minor parties. Almost one fourth of major party supporter (4.3% of 22.6%, 4.5% of 19.6%) and one third of undecided voter (8.0% of 20.7%) switched to choose minor parties in the election day, which boosts the voteshare of the minor parties by 8.5 percent. In comparison, most of the minor party supporters (28.7% of 37.1%) were not moved in the election. However, there is no correlation between the change of choice and subjective evaluation of iVoter.
How did it happen? I argue that it is because the VAA provides a relatively neutral platform which evenly presents the information of all parties and candidates. In real world, rich candidates and major parties can buy numerous campaign ads to bombard the voters, which is unfair for minor parties; VAA can help mitigate the problem, at least basing on the 
Toward a better VAA
In the basic spatial voting model (Downs, 1957) , both voter and candidate know the policy position of each other; vote-maximizing candidates approach the median voter's ideal point, while voters choose the candidate with the smallest policy distance. The iVoter program tries to realize the mechanism by matching the candidates and the voters based on the 21-item policy preference questionnaire. However, the practical challenge emerged in each step of realization, which is worthy exploring for the future VAA development.
Based on the data from the iVoter program in 2012 Taiwan Legislative Election, this chapter provides the evidence to show how VAA actually works. In the information supply side, candidates who is young, familiar with the Internet, and incumbent tend to cooperate with iVoter; there is no difference on the level of cooperation among candidates from major and minor parties. In the information demand side, iVoter registered participants were mostly young, male, and well-educated. The four fifth of the participants considered iVoter as helpful, and this supportive attitude correlates with more online political participation among the least-engaged voters.
Even though iVoter did not boost the turnout, Table 5 implies that iVoter made the minor party much attractive to the voters; one fourth of the voters who originally preferred major party or were undecided cast ballot to the minor party in election day. This evidence may be helpful on persuading more minor party candidates to cooperate with VAA in the future. With the advance and the spread of the Internet technology, it can be optimistic that in the future more candidates and voters can be matched through the VAA.
Numerous questions are left for future work. First, why did incumbent, not challenger, tend to cooperate with VAA? Are the answers candidates provided accountable after they were elected? Once we provided the evidence that iVoter is beneficial for the minor party candidates, will major party members keep cooperating with us? How do we successfully provide our application to those who really need the campaign information? Some of the questions above cannot be answered by the iVoter debut, but the experience of iVoter here can enhance the future development of VAA, which can keep exploring the connection between policy, candidate, and voters. 2 The major difference between iVoter and EUProfiler is that EUProfiler chooses the party as unit, while iVoter targets individual candidate. The advantage of iVoter's approach is that it is possible to discover the intra-party conflict among the partisan candidates. Besides, individual-candidate-level data can help us understand how do candidates strike the balance between the median voter and the order from the whip.
However, one potential weakness of this approach is that it may decrease the response rate.
